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BARBADOS - What meaning, Minister Sinckler’s “I shall Resign if …”?

Finance Minister Christopher Sinckler Finance Minister Christopher Sinckler
DATELINE MIAMI - January 26, 2017 - There’s apparent consensus on one aspect of Barbados’ economy: it’s in crisis. Stunted growth accompanies fiscal and balance of payments deficits. Recurring sovereign debt downgrades persist despite austerity measures (layoffs, increased taxation, delayed attention to public utility provision) accompanied by Central bank and reportedly, National Insurance Scheme accommodation supporting government expenditure.

It’s useful, perhaps instructive to compare Barbados to Greece in its recent crisis – almost GREXIT – upon first confronting debt default on private banks’ loans before fighting ‘Official Europe’ and the IMF over continuing austerity measures to qualify for a bailout. Greece borrowed heavily during heady days of Wall Street led casino type operations of questionable lending and dicey derivative creation precipitated by the unfettered amorality deregulation allowed.

Wilbern Persaud1
Author: Wilberne Persaud | Consultant Economist

European banks – French, German and Greek – had for years established loans with Greece that experts considered reckless. Even then, European officialdom perceived Greece as plagued by “tax evasion, corruption and oligarchic habits”, purveying economic statistics of questionable reliability. For instance, published debt to GDP estimates of 6-8 per cent turned out doubled – 12.5 per cent. Unsurprisingly Greece’s credit rating plummeted – in Bajan speak – through the eddoes!

Barbados’ problems began emerging in 2009. Two accidents, rather, crashes occurred. First 2008 Wall Street Meltdown – Great Recession. Shortly thereafter – January 2009 CLICO crash. Their mention together doesn’t imply cause and effect.

What policy response? To the first there was none. The Great Recession, it was argued, wouldn’t impact Barbados. Why? Possibly because much of Barbados’ tourism source market is not the USA. Considering globalization interconnectedness non-response was a mistake. The second misfortune triggered no clear remedial policy. Consider the Statutory Fund shortfall CLICO’s meltdown revealed – a sum in excess of Bds$300Mn – a mere fraction of total exposure. Imagine Barbadians’ financial loss. More importantly for policy, what negative economic impact was likely to, and did occur?

Imagine a household head with holdings of $1.5Mn in Executive Flexible Premium Annuity (EFPA) plus an ongoing insurance policy. Prudent conservative Barbadian onto a good thing! LG – life’s good. One pleasant Sunday morning financial health evaporates! Apart from depression and suicidal thoughts s/he must adjust. Plans morph to indefinite hold, or abandoned. New income generation stalls, rippling impacts across the economy. Taxable income declines, expectations and confidence in the future among many deteriorate.

Fiscal and balance of payments deficits worsen as UK policy and flagging economic conditions exacerbate declines in tourism receipts. Layoffs reduce income levels while Value Added Tax (VAT) rate increase drives up consumers’ everyday costs at their moment of reduced capacity. Policy related to VAT increase appears inaccurately modeled. So with falling income and employment levels, increased rates fail to generate projected revenue increase – disposable income, after all, governs consumption expenditure.

Apparently no consensus solution exists. Current responses suggest further tax increases, privatisation of state entities, approach to the IMF and devaluation. The latter seem separate responses; they are, however, one and the same. They offer immediate relief: funds at low interest to improve the balance of payments. Devaluation is projected to cut imports, increase exports with particular reliance on tourism receipts.

Privatisation offers potential revenue generation enabling immediate fiscal deficit reduction. Problem is crisis conditions guarantee government asset sales yield fire sale bids. It is sub-optimal strategy to sell assets on an ad hoc basis when in fiscal trouble. Appraisers term this ‘forced sale’. Privatisation works best when proactively developed, preferably in time of plenty.

Taxing already shrinking incomes shall create independently, or in some combination: hardship for financially incapable among the population; private sector opposition including further postponement of investment projects populating the drawing board; likely outcry against previous generous tax breaks provided private sector interests hoping to address this very problem.

Who likely faces the burden of adjustment in this scenario? PAYE bread winners feel this first? Perhaps. Absent details, forecast hazardous.

Comparison with Greece becomes interesting. First, Barbados’ debt pales compared to Greece. Greek official and private debt exceeded 175% of GDP at €323bn. Austerity previously froze wages, increased taxes and took the axe to pensions. The Troika (European Commission, European Central Bank and International Monetary Fund) insisted Greece privatise state assets, extend austerity measures to health-care and welfare. Devote Greek income primarily to debt service.

Finance Minister Yanis Varoufakis figured differently. Greece should embrace manifest insolvency. He presumed debt forgiveness allowing “a proper resolution – to an agreement that involves debt restructuring, less austerity, redistribution in favour of the needy, and real reforms.” After a Greek referendum rejecting Troika conditions prompted no change he resigned proclaiming he “... shall wear the creditors’ loathing with pride.” Think by analogy: Greece – intensive care; Barbados – emergency room.

Finance Minister Sinckler insists devaluation shall trigger his resignation. As bald statement of intent his thinking and meaning are unclear. Does he, as a policy matter, reject devaluation? Is Cabinet contemplating it? Does he fear political implications of devaluation, believing he may be unable to achieve IMF support without it? Does he have economic performance indicators unavailable publicly that render IMF support unnecessary, driving an ultimate show of confidence – willingness to risk all – knowing that outcome is impossible?

If the latter, who believes him? If investors and consumers are in disbelief, will there be a response similar in conclusion to Greek attempts to change their ‘politics’? More questions than answers!

Wilberne Persaud, Op-Ed Columnist, Consultant Economist This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it.

Last modified onFriday, 27 January 2017 07:09
  • Countries: Barbados

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